How Zimbabwe’s Grain Laws Trap Farmers, Reward Side-Dealers and Inflate Every Bag of Feed
Agricultural Markets Desk · 29 April 2026
It has been illegal to buy maize from a Zimbabwean farmer outside the state marketing board for most of the past two decades. The law has never stopped the black market. It has, however, made life considerably harder for every honest farmer, miller, and feed producer in the country — and it is about to get more complicated still.
Imagine you are a farmer in Mashonaland East. You have just brought in a decent maize harvest — better than the last two years, which were disaster seasons. A private miller drives up and offers you US$350 a tonne, cash, today, in US dollars. The Grain Marketing Board planning price is US$380 a tonne — slightly more on paper — but the GMB will pay you in ZiG at the official rate, and when you do the maths using what a dollar actually costs on the street, you are getting the equivalent of US$241 to US$298. The GMB might also take weeks to pay. Maybe months.
Most farmers in that position sell to the miller. And under Statutory Instrument 145 of 2019, every single one of them is committing a criminal offence punishable by up to two years in prison.
This is Zimbabwe’s grain market. And it has worked this way, in various forms, for over twenty years.
How We Got Here
In 2001, the government declared maize, wheat, and milled products “controlled commodities” under Statutory Instrument 235A, with the GMB as the sole legal buyer and seller. Combined with fixed prices and rampant inflation, the result was that farmers earned less and less in real terms and produced less accordingly. Zimbabwe began its long slide from regional breadbasket to chronic grain importer.
Market reforms in 2009 partially relaxed the monopoly. The GMB became buyer of last resort rather than sole channel, private traders could operate alongside it, and for a few years the system breathed. That liberalisation was reversed in June 2019 with SI 145 of 2019, which reinstated the full buying monopoly. Two businesspeople — grain dealer Allan Markham and farmer Clever Rambanapasi — immediately filed a High Court application arguing the SI was unconstitutional, that it stripped citizens of the right to trade freely under sections 56, 58, 64, and 71 of Zimbabwe’s own constitution.
By 2022 the contradiction had become impossible to ignore. The GMB was paying the equivalent of US$75 to US$150 per tonne in real terms, against regional market prices of US$290 to US$350. Farmers held their grain. The Ministry of Lands instructed the GMB to work with security forces — including the Joint Operations Command — to conduct what were called “grain busting operations,” seizing maize from farms and at roadblocks. The World Food Programme formally warned the monopoly was “negatively impacting food availability and access.” The black market flourished as never before.
Amendments in 2023 created narrow exceptions for registered contractors and certified warehouse operators. Movement permits were formalised at US$10 per vehicle. The market remained structurally closed. And in September 2025, Statutory Instrument 87 of 2025 went further still — outlawing grain and oilseed imports except under urgent-need exemptions, and mandating that all processors must source 40 percent of raw materials locally by April 1, 2026, rising to 100 percent by April 2028.
That April 2026 deadline has now passed. Millers and feed manufacturers have already applied for AMA import permits for 266,000 tonnes under urgent-need provisions. The first year of compliance is patchy, to put it generously.
Why the Monopoly Fails — Every Time
The logic behind the GMB monopoly is not entirely irrational. Controlling all maize purchases allows the state to accumulate strategic reserves, shield urban consumers from price spikes, and prevent speculative intermediaries from profiting at the expense of both farmers and end consumers. It is a coherent theory. It has not worked in practice, and the reasons are structural rather than accidental.
The fundamental flaw is price. When the GMB’s buying price is set below what the open market would offer — and the ZiG payment mechanism makes the real value of that price even lower — farmers have no rational incentive to deliver through formal channels. A farmer owed US$380 per tonne who is paid in ZiG at the official rate of 25.4 ZiG per USD receives 9,652 ZiG. At the parallel market rate of 33 to 40 ZiG per USD, that payment is worth US$241 to US$298. The shortfall is 21 to 37 percent — before any payment delay. Every week of delay makes it worse.
Agricultural economist Dr Richman Mano has put the broader problem plainly. Zimbabwe’s GMB maize price is already 46 to 58 percent higher than Zambian domestic prices. By setting its planning price that far above regional norms, Zimbabwe is simultaneously trying to incentivise local production and pricing its processing industry out of the market for every product that uses local grain as an input.
“Zimbabwe is effectively pricing itself out of the SADC market for staple grains and higher-value manufactured consumer food products by overpricing its grains by regional and global standards,” he said.
What You Can and Cannot Do — Right Now
| Activity | Status | What it means in practice |
|---|---|---|
| Farmer sells to GMB | Legal | Guaranteed outlet, but ZiG payment at official rate |
| Registered contractor buys from farmer it financed | Legal | Must be AMA-registered beforehand |
| Self-financed farmer sells via ZMX certified warehouse | Legal | ZMX-registered warehouse only |
| Miller buys directly from self-financed farmer | Restricted | Must register as contractor; government may cap quantities |
| Any entity buys maize from a farmer on the open market | Illegal | Up to 2 years in prison under SI 145 of 2019 |
| Transporting more than 5 bags without a permit | Illegal | Police empowered to seize grain at roadblocks |
| Processor imports grain | Restricted | AMA urgent-need permit required under SI 87 of 2025 |
The New Law and What It Actually Means
Statutory Instrument 87 of 2025 arrives with bold ambitions. By mandating that processors source 40 percent of their grain locally from April 2026, rising to 100 percent by 2028, the government is trying to create a guaranteed domestic market that gives farmers the confidence to invest in production. The theory is sound. But processors are being compelled to buy the most expensive maize in the region as a matter of law.
“We will be compelled to utilise one market and be precluded from using another one which might be more competitive,” one miller said in March 2026. It is hard to argue with that assessment.
There is also a logistics problem. Even when sufficient domestic maize exists, it is not always aggregated where processors can access it efficiently. SI 87 proponents note that the GMB operates over 1,800 maize collection points — but effective coordination between the GMB and private processors has historically been weak. Without it, the localisation mandate produces paper compliance rather than real supply chain change.
The Core Contradiction
The Food Crop Contractors Association of Zimbabwe has pushed for years to open the monopoly and allow private sector participation in grain purchasing. Their argument: private players would pre-finance farmers, pay quickly in US dollars, and create the competitive market dynamics that would actually incentivise production growth. Commercial Farmers’ Union president Andrew Pascoe has been equally direct: “Farming is a business and we as farmers would like to sell what we produce at the best price available in the market. If we are not given a fair price, we will not be in a position to produce in the coming season and food shortages will become a big problem.”
The evidence supports this. The combination of below-import-parity GMB prices in real currency terms, delayed payments, a criminal penalty for side-marketing, and now a mandatory local sourcing requirement creates a system in which the rational behaviour for farmers, millers, and traders alike is to operate outside it. The SI regime does not eliminate the black market in maize. It creates it, sustains it, and makes it structurally necessary. Until the fundamental contradiction between an official buying price and a parallel-market currency reality is resolved, no planning price will reliably translate into the domestic supply the framework assumes.
Need grain or feed you can actually rely on? Our directory lists verified suppliers operating transparently within the legal framework — clear pricing, legitimate documentation, and stock that is available when you need it. Find grain suppliers or browse feed manufacturers.
Also in this series:
The Full Price Equation: What Is Really Driving the Cost of Your Chicken, Eggs, and Flour
Priced Out of the Region: What 40% Local Sourcing Will Cost Zimbabwe’s Chicken and Feed Sector
Sources: SI 145/2019 (GMB website); SI 87/2025 (Government Gazette, 5 September 2025); FairPlanet (August 2022); The Zimbabwe Independent; The Zimbabwe Mail; AllAfrica; FAO GIEWS; USDA FAS; WFP Monthly Food Security Reports; Commercial Farmers’ Union; Food Crop Contractors Association of Zimbabwe; Dr Richman Mano / The Herald (October 2025).
3 responses to “How Zimbabwe’s Grain Laws Trap Farmers, Reward Side-Dealers and Inflate Every Bag of Feed”
[…] and a volatile rand, to compete against. The feed cost problem is not unique to South Africa — grain laws and dealer networks across the region similarly inflate the cost of every bag of feed for smallholder and commercial producers […]
[…] feed already consumed. Layer feed in Zimbabwe is expensive — structurally so, as explained in our grain laws and feed cost analysis. An 18-week pullet has consumed roughly 6 to 7 kg of starter and grower feed before you receive […]
[…] and the nutritional gaps that force farmers to compensate with medicines. The reality that grain laws and dealer networks inflate the cost of every bag of feed is one of the structural barriers this theme must […]